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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In this case the extension was unquestionably justified. The
basis for this decision may be best determined by the language used
by the Court, when it states "[s] o unconscionable a result, so unfor-
tunate a preference of one wrongdoer over another, should not be
countenanced if there be any escape therefrom." 24 The Court, with
this in mind, seized upon the word "adjudged," and, by strict con-
struction, held that the defendant was sufficiently adjudged a
wrongdoer.
The instant case points out the inadequacy of the existing statute.
There is no question that the defendant-director should not have been
entitled to litigation expenses, but it was only through a strained
interpretation that the court could arrive at a just result. While the
decision might be regarded by some as a wedge in the door of the
"mandatory" rule, the statute will continue to work an injustice in
a great many cases. It seems most unjust that an erring director
should be entitled to expenses from the corporation which he has
harmed, merely because a stockholder fails to meet the requirements
of Section 61-b of the General Corporation Law, or because the stat-
ute of limitations has run.
Legislation should be enacted providing that the court be em-
powered to inquire into the facts, and where it is clear that such
directors have been guilty of misconduct, that they be precluded from
recovering counsel fees. The California statute 2 5 might well serve
as a model for such legislation. Care should be taken, however, not
to make the rule so stringent that the evils existing under the "benefit"
rule would once more return.26
CORPORATIONS- REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS AS INHERENT RIGHT
OF STOCKHOLDERS.-A proceeding under Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Act was brought for an order in the nature of
mandamus I to compel the defendant, president of a corporation, to
call a stockholders' meeting. Among other reasons, petitioners sought
the meeting to enable the shareholders to vote upon a proposal to
hear charges against some of the directors and, if cause were shown,
24 Id. at 266, 120 N.E.2d at 820.
25 CAr_ Coap. CDE § 830 (Deering, 1953). This Section provides that in
addition to being successful in whole or in part, the court must find that his
conduct fairly and equitably merits such indemnity.
26 See notes 9 and 10 supra.
1 New York, in 1937, abolished the proceeding of mandamus. See
PRAsHKER, NEw YoRK PRAcric 825 (3d ed. 1954). Today, an action which
would have been brought by this proceeding is governed by Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Act.
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to remove them. In affirming the lower court which granted the
order, the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that a provision in the
certificate of incorporation, authorizing the directors to remove one
of their number, did not destroy the shareholders' inherent right to
remove erring directors, and that therefore this purpose was a valid
ground for demanding a meeting. Matter of Auer v. Dressel, 306
N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
It is axiomatic that a corporation's activities are governed by
the constitution and laws of the state which authorizes its existence,
by the certificate of incorporation which is granted by such state,
2
and by its own by-laws.3  In New York, the power to commence an
action to remove a director for cause is given by statute to the attorney
general. 4  This does not restrict a corporation from exercising the
power in a manner which to it may seem fit.5 In the utilization of
this power, however, corporations in New York have been restricted
by the courts.
It has been stated that the board of directors may not remove a
fellow director either with or without cause unless the power is spe-
cifically given by the certificate of incorporation or the corporate
by-laws.6 The shareholders, however, because of their right to elect
directors, may always remove a director where cause exists; 7 but
2 See PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CoRPoRATioxs 249
(2d ed. 1949).
3 See Note, Limitations of Corporate By-Laws, 19 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 144
(1945).
4 "An action may be brought against one or more of the directors or officers
of a corporation to procure judgment for the following relief or any part
thereof:
"4. To remove a defendant from office and to direct the filling of the
vacancy in accordance with the charter and by-laws of the corporation, or, if
they contain no provision therefor, in such manner as the court shall direct."
N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 60. "An action may be brought for the relief pre-
scribed in section sixty of this chapter, by the attorney-general in behalf of the
people of the state... ." N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61. Cf. People v. Ballard,
134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892).
5 Section 136 of the General Corporation Law, which states that "[a] di-
rector or officer of a corporation shall not be suspended or removed from office
by a court or judge, otherwise than by final judgment in an action brought by
the attorney-general, as prescribed in section sixty of this chapter," is not to
the contrary. See Matter of Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590
(1954) ; People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 202, 94 N.E. 634, 637
(1911).
6 See Matter of Korff, 198 App. Div. 553, 190 N.Y. Supp. 664 (1st Dep't
1921) (without cause); Raub v. Gerken, 127 App. Div. 42, 111 N.Y. Supp.
319 (2d Dep't 1908) (without cause); BAI.I.ANTiNE, CORPORATIONS 436 (Rev.
ed. 1946); 2 FL.ErcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 162-164 (Rev. vol. 1954).
But cf. Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 41, 175 N.E. 506 (1931).
7See Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd,
155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS 434 (Rev. ed. 1946); cf. Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 212,
281 N.Y. Supp. 373, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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they are not permitted to remove a director without cause unless they
are empowered to do so by a provision in either the certificate or the
by-laws.8 This lack of power is based upon the fact that directors
are not considered to be mere employees of the corporation, but rather,
are fiduciaries in the nature of trustees.9 However, directors who are
in office prior to the time any such provision is adopted in the charter
or by-laws may not be removed pursuant thereto.'0 The protection
of directors against removal without cause has been criticized on the
ground that such a restriction deprives the shareholders of managerial
control which is an essential attribute of corporate ownership."
Nevertheless, New York has adhered to the rule that a director may
not be removed without cause-subject to the conditions discussed
above.
In the instant case, the certificate of incorporation gave the board
of directors power to remove directors for proven cause. The share-
holders had not reserved to themselves the power of removal. Thus
the question before the Court was whether such delegation of power
to the directors had abrogated the shareholders' right to remove.
The Court held that the provision in the certificate was not ". . . an
abdication by the stockholders of their own traditional, inherent power
to remove their own directors." 12 The Court believed that if it held
otherwise, wrongdoing directors who controlled the board would not
be inclined to divest themselves of office, and that therefore the share-
holders would be without a remedy. In a vigorous dissent, Judge
Van Voorhis pointed out that where both the shareholders and the
directorate have the capacity to remove wrongdoing directors, dif-
ferent results might obtain from their separate investigations.1 In
dismissing the majority's fear of the results of an opposite conclusion,
he indicated that the attorney general could always be called upon to
prosecute an action for removal.' 4
It would seem that the holding of the instant case is opposed
to the axiom that the state's statutes and the corporation's charter
and by-laws are the only sources from which the shareholders derive
their rights. But the Court is merely sustaining an inherent right
associated with ownership, and one which is essential to that status.
Ownership, then, carries with it certain rights which need not be
expressed in the charter or by-laws. As the owners of a corporation,
shareholders are justified in asserting the right to remove miscreant
8 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 434 (Rev. ed. 1946) (cases cited therein).
9 See People ex reL. Manice v. Powell, supra note 5 at 200-201, 94 N.E. at
637; PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 642-643
(2d ed. 1949).
'
0 Matter of Automotive Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc., 120 Misc. 405, 199
N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; see Abberger v. Kulp, supra note 7.
"':See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 434-435 (Rev. ed. 1946).
12 Matter of Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 433, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1954).
'1Id. at 438, 118 N.E.2d at 596.
14 Id. at 441, 118 N.E.2d at 598. See note 4 supra.
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managers. The principle enunciated in this case of first impression
permits shareholders to exercise a greater voice in the management
of their business affairs.
M
FEDERAL PRACTICE-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-SET-OFF AGAINST
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ALLOWED.-The Shanghai-Nanking Railway
Administration, an official agency of the Republic of China, estab-
lished a $200,000 account with the National City Bank of New York
in 1948. Subsequently, the bank refused to permit withdrawal of the
funds. The Republic of China thereupon brought suit in the fed-
eral district court wherein the bank raised two counterclaims for
$1,634,432,' which it later denominated as a set-off. Both the district
court and court of appeals refused to allow such a set-off, stating
that it was violative of the doctrine of sovereign immunity since the
set-off did not arise out of the same transaction as the sovereign's
claim. By a divided court, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not preclude the defendant
from raising any set-off. The Court reasoned that by initiating the
action in this country the foreign sovereign impliedly subjected itself
to such set-off or counterclaims. National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 75 Sup. Ct. 423 (1955).
The origin of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not clear.
The prevailing opinion appears to be that it originated early in Eng-
lish history and reached its maturity with the divine right of kings
theory.2 When the United States Constitution was drafted little was
said concerning this immunity principle, and nothing applicable to it
was incorporated therein.8 In 1793 the Supreme Court, in Chisholm
v. Georgia,4 held that a state was subject to a suit brought by a citizen
of another state. Immediately after this decision, the Constitution
was amended so as to preclude such suits.5 No mention, however,
I Both counterclaims arose out of treasury notes issued by the Chinese
government which had become due and payable.2 See Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity,
13 LA. L. REv. 476, 477-480 (1953). See also Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 349, 350-355 (1925) ; Borchard, Governmental Respon-
sibility In Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-37 (1926).
3 It has been suggested that a literal interpretation of Article III would
justify a suit against the Federal Government. See Pugh, supra note 2, at 481.
Blackstone recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity in his writings and
this played an important part in the molding of American thought concerning
this question. Id. at 479, 481.
42 DalU. 419 (U.S. 1793).
5 "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
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